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Johnny C. Parkert
I. Introduction
Since the signing of the Declaration of Independence no so-
cial issue has caused more concern and controversy than that of
race.1 Voluminous studies document the sociological and eco-
nomic impact which ethnic and racial prejudices have played in
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law; B.A., 1982, Univer-
sity of Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi School of Law; LL.M., 1987,
Columbia University School of Law.
1. Justice Taney in 1856 observed that the statement: "We hold these truths to be
self evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
. ... " was not intended by the drafters to include members of the African race. Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856).
"Race" as used in this Article refers to a population distinguished by genetically
transmitted physical characteristics. It is to be contrasted with "ethnic" which has a
broader connotation. "Ethnic" refers to a group of people united or classified together on
the basis of common religion, culture, and history. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 467,
1020 (2d College ed. 1982).
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the history of this country.2 While most ethnic groups, to vary-
ing degrees, have assimilated into the traditional notion of a cul-
tural melting pot, one racial group still flounders in its search for
historical, cultural and legal identity.
The uniqueness of the African-American3 experience cannot
be fully understood by non African-Americans. Only by examin-
ing the historical methodology developed by our tripartite form
of government, with its unique system of checks and balances,
can non African-Americans understand the complexities which
surround the African-American question: How do we assimilate
a group of individuals with such distinct genetically transmitted
physical characteristics into our capitalistic society?
There have been many suggested solutions to the African-
American question. Politicians and private individuals alike
have proposed solutions ranging from social welfare to repara-
tion. Responses of this nature fail to consider the magnitude of
the question, including such considerations as implementation
costs and the effects of social stigmas.
The federal Congress and Supreme Court have attempted to
address the African-American question of assimilation for more
than 150 years. These co-equal branches have, at times, treated
the inquiry as if it were two distinct questions. Early judicial
interpretations of civil rights legislation demonstrate this fact.4
This conduct is responsible, in part, for the transformation of
the African-American question from a social issue into a social
dilemma.
How do we assimilate a group of individuals with such dis-
tinct genetically transmitted physical characteristics? A logical
starting point in answering this query is to define the question
in simple, concise and comprehensible terms. To assimilate
means to make similar, to absorb into the cultural identity.5
2. See, e.g., R. CHERRY. DISCRIMINATION: ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT ON BLACKS, WOMEN
AND JEWS 69-91 (1989); M. CLINARD, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 677-96 (3d ed.
1968).
3. This nomenclature was carefully selected from the many historical terms used to
describe Americans of African descent.
4. "The Equal Protection Clause, however, was '[v]irtually strangled in infancy by
post-civil-war judicial reactionism.' It was relegated to decades of relative desuetude ...
" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1977) (quoting Tusman & ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 381 (1949)).
5. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 135 (2d. College ed. 1982).
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This definition leads us to inquire whether assimilation is possi-
ble from a theoretical and practical perspective.
If we assume that "to make similar, to absorb into the cul-
tural identity" requires similarities other than those common to
all Homo sapiens, assimilation becomes theoretically and practi-
cally impossible. Logic alone demonstrates that African-Ameri-
cans, in light of certain immutable characteristics, are not physi-
cally similar to other racial groups. Furthermore, history reflects
that it is precisely these immutable characteristics that have
served as the social justification for treating African-Americans
differently from members of other cultures.6
If, however, we assume that "to make similar, to absorb into
the cultural identity" means to make similar in terms of the op-
portunities, choices and rights that are available, then assimila-
tion becomes at least theoretically possible. It is this notion of
equality of opportunity that underscores the foundation of this
country's culture.
How to transform the theoretical and practical into reality,
however, becomes the next inquiry. This question has con-
founded both Congress and the Court. The African-American
question has been posed time and time again. Although answers,
like manna from heaven, are constantly forthcoming, no one has
managed to resolve the problem.
This Article suggests that the solution to the African-Amer-
ican issue can be found within the distinct, yet interrelated, dis-
ciplines of education and employment. There is support for the
view that directly attacking the inequalities in American society
would be more advantageous than ameliorating these through
affirmative programs in education and employment, which are
only indirectly related to the causes of such inequalities.7 I be-
lieve, however, that economic opportunities based on quality ed-
ucation can better ameliorate unfavorable environmental and so-
cial factors. It should be noted that although this approach is
not novel, it has never been fully integrated into the African-
6. See 0. HANDLIN, RACE AND NATIONALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 1-28 (1957) ("Color
then emerged as the token of the slave status; the trace of color became the trace of
slavery."). Id. at 21.
7. See, e.g., M.L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 1-38, 137-69 (1964); E. RUDWICK,
W.E.B. Du Bois: PROPAGANDIST OF THE NEGRO PROTEST 54-76, 184-207 (1968); see also R.
WRIGHT, WHITE MAN, LISTEN! ix-xii (1957).
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American experience.
This Article will examine the African-American question in
light of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Part II chronicles the historical development of the Afri-
can-American question and equal protection. In addition, it doc-
uments both congressional and judicial responses to the African-
American question between 1789 and 1945, and charts the trans-
formation of the African-American question from a social to a
constitutional issue. Part III focuses on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and judicial interpretations
thereof. Part III also examines the various standards developed
by the United States Supreme Court since 1948 to analyze the
equal protection clause and documents the current status of
equal protection as it relates to the education and employment
of African-Americans. This Article concludes that the Supreme
Court must reconsider traditional equal protection standards of
review in the area of affirmative action.
II. Historical Development
The African-American question has its genesis in the insti-
tution commonly referred to as slavery. This issue, however, did
not appear crucial in the first decade following the ratification of
the Constitution. During that period, the question was simply:
How should slaves be treated for purposes of political represen-
tation? This question became politically controversial only with
regard to the admittance of new states into the Union.8
By 1820 the African-American question had been reformu-
lated into the issue of whether slavery should be abolished. The
question was catapulted to the forefront of national politics with
the pending admission of Missouri as a slave state.' Missouri's
8. Article I of the Constitution provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the Several states
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, includ-
ing those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 3. This language was superseded by the fourteenth amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. The political struggle over the spread of slavery into new territories was a dra-
matic manifestation of national division. 29 THE NE w ENCYCLOPAEDA BRrrANNICA 222
[Vol. 11:213
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admission as a slave state would have tipped the balance of
power in both houses of Congress in favor of slavery.10 In an at-
tempt to maintain political equilibrium, the Missouri Compro-
mise of 1820 was adopted and a crisis averted." The tension sur-
rounding the African-American question increased during the
period following the enactment of the Missouri Compromise. 12
However, it was not until California, a territory on the slave side
of the Missouri Compromise line, applied for statehood in 1849
under a free soil constitution, that the controversy again rose to
the level of a national crisis.'3 Congress reacted by delaying Cali-
fornia's admission and enacting the Compromise of 1850. This
enactment included the admission of California into the Union,
the creation of a strict law enforcing the return of fugitive slaves
to their masters and recognition of the principle of popular sov-
ereignty for other territories. 4
In 1854, four years after the Compromise of 1850, the Kan-
sas-Nebraska Act1 5 proposed to apply the principle of popular
sovereignty to the Kansas-Nebraska territories. This Bill, for the
first time, removed the African-American issue from the floors of
Congress to the territorial conventions.' 6
The United States Supreme Court totally disregarded the
African-American controversy between the years 1789 and 1854.
During most of this period, the Court was preoccupied with so-
lidifying its position in the American system of checks and bal-
(15th ed. 1987).
10. Prior to the Missouri Compromise, an eleven to eleven balance between free and
slave states existed in the Senate. The free states consisted of Connecticut, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island and Vermont while the slave states included Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Virginia. In addition, Florida and Arkansas were slave territories. L. FILLER, THE CRU-
SADE AGAINST SLAVERY 11 (1960).
11. The Missouri Compromise preserved the balance between the states by admit-
ting Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state and by confining the extension of
slavery within the territory of the Louisiana Purchase to the area south of the 36* 30'
line, with the exception of the Territory of Missouri. 29 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 222 (15th ed. 1987).
12. Id.
13. See J.M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE 64 (1982).
14. Id. at 63-69.
15. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
16. MCPHERSON, supra note 13, at 86-89.
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ances and, with only one exception, consistently upheld the
power of the federal government over the states. 7
However, in 1857 the Supreme Court launched itself into
the controversy. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,' the Court ad-
dressed the substantive issue of whether the federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear and determine cases brought by persons of
African descent. The opinion is of historical importance because
the Court upset the Missouri Compromise by denying that Con-
gress had the power to prohibit slavery in the territories.1 9 Dred
Scott effectively marked the end of political compromise over
the African-American question.
During the reconstruction period following the Civil War,
Congress enacted numerous laws to combat legislative and other
attempts by southern states to keep the newly freed blacks in
involuntary servitude. For example, following the ratification of
the thirteenth amendment,2 0 Congress passed the Freedmen's
Bureau Act2 l and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.22
17. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution gives Congress wide scope of authority) and United
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805) (the Court upheld federal legislation giving
the United States government priority as a creditor) with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (the Court held that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in
enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789).
18. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
19. Id. at 446-48.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Id. § 1.
21. Freedmen Bureau Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-5, 13 Stat. 507 (1865). The Bureau of Refu-
gees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands was charged with "the control of all subjects
relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states .... Id. § 1.
1 22. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not withstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Parts of the Civil Rights Act of
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/1
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Opponents of these acts attacked them as beyond Congress'
power under the thirteenth amendment. In an attempt to re-
solve questions related to the validity of these acts, Congress
drafted and ratified the fourteenth"s and fifteenth24 amend-
ments. Following ratification of these amendments, Congress en-
acted other legislation for the protection of African-Americans.2 5
Civil rights legislation enacted during reconstruction was
uniformly ineffectual, due in significant part to the Supreme
Court which severely limited Congress' power to protect civil
rights. In cases such as United States v. Reese26 and James v.
Bowman,7 the Court struck down portions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1870. Similarly, in United States v. Harris28 and Baldwin
1866 have been reenacted. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was derived from section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and sections 16 and 18 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. See Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16,
18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was derived from section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 was derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and section 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871);
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was derived
from section 3 of the 1866 Act and section 18 of the 1870 Act. See Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140,
144 (1870).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. § 1.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." Id. § 1.
25. See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985).
This legislation included the Enforcement Act of 1870, which added additional criminal
penalties and provided for jurisdiction in the federal courts over suits alleging racially
inspired interference with the right to vote; the 1871 Civil Rights Act, aimed at the activ-
ities of the Ku Klux Klan and which added civil remedies; and the 1875 Civil Rights Act,
which outlawed racial discrimination in places of public accommodation and provided
civil and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions. Id. at 5.
26. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
27. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
28. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
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v. Franks,29 the Court invalidated the criminal conspiracy sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Statutes which were not
struck down as unconstitutional were subjected to a narrow con-
struction that effectively crippled their impact.
In 1879 the African-American question was linked to the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in
Strauder v. West Virginia.30 Justice Strong, writing for the
Court observed:
[The fourteenth amendment] ordains that no State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection
the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color? The
words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they con-
tain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race - the right to exemption from un-
friendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored - exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferi-
ority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of
the rights which others enjoy .... 31
This dicta was ignored by the Supreme Court a decade later
in the Civil Rights Cases.32 In the Civil Rights Cases the Court,
relying on the plain meaning of the language of the fourteenth
amendment, held that racial discrimination occurring as a result
bf private action did not involve a constitutional issue." This
holding effectively overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875.1,
29. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
30. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
31. Id. at 307-08.
32. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
33. The Court noted that the explicit language of the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides that "no state" shall deny equal protection of the laws; it does not provide that "no
person" shall deny equal protection and Congress in passing laws to enforce the amend-
ment may not make it a crime to do what the amendment does not forbid. Id. at 11.
34. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 2, 18 Stat. 336 (1875). The Civil Rights Act of
1875 provided in pertinent part:
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen
[Vol. 11:213
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In 1896, the Supreme Court was confronted with the ques-
tion of whether segregation imposed by state law violated the
equal protection clause. Plessy v. Ferguson-" involved legislation
passed by Louisiana in 1890 which mandated: "that all railway
companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State,
shall provide equal but separate accomodations for the white,
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches
for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by
a partition .... "3 6 A fine of twenty-five dollars or twenty days in
jail was the penalty for sitting in the wrong compartment.
Plessy, who was one-eighth black, refused to vacate a seat in the
white compartment of a railway car and was arrested for violat-
ing the statute.-7
Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the Court, noted in
part:
The object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distin-
guished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races
upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even
requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not univer-
sally, recognized as within the competency of the state legisla-
tures in the exercise of their police power.38
The Plessy decision represents the low watermark with re-
gard to both the African-American question of assimilation and
... the full enjoyment of any of the accomodations, advantages, facilities, or priv-
ileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for
every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person
aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall
also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one
thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than
one year ....
Id.
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. Id. at 540.
37. Id. at 541-42.
38. Id. at 544.
1991]
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equal protection interpretation 3 9 The Supreme Court, influ-
enced by contemporary history and social conditions, effectively
thwarted congressional attempts to provide equality of opportu-
nity, rights and interests to African-Americans.
III. Equal Protection: An Analytical Framework
For nearly sixty years the doctrine of separate but equal was
firmly entrenched. It was not until 1945 that the Supreme Court
began to understand that PlessyU effectively denied equal op-
portunity, interests and rights. Between 1945 and 1972 the Su-
preme Court departed from its almost laissez faire attitude to-
ward African-Americans and began enforcing civil rights laws
and developing uniform standards of review for equal protection
challenges.41
The first analytical standard developed by the Court was ar-
ticulated in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia."' This test, re-
ferred to as the rational basis test, required that the government
have a rational basis for treating similarly situated people or ac-
tivities differently and that the basis be related to a constitu-
tionally permissible objective."3
F.S. Royster involved a Virginia law that taxed all the in-
come of local corporations derived from business done within
and without the state, while exempting from taxation those local
corporations that derived income solely from outside the state."4
The plaintiff argued that the classifications created by the legis-
lation violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 45
Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, noted that
39. Though the Court tended to water down the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment and civil rights legislation based thereon, it did, in that period, give meaning
to the equal protection clause particularly in the area of the administration of justice.
See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (Court upheld the conviction of a county
judge for excluding blacks from the jury lists on the basis of race); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (Court held that a black man was entitled to be tried by a
jury from which blacks had not been excluded on the basis of race).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. See generally Blackmun, supra note 23, at 12-19.
42. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
43. Id. at 415.
44. Id. at 414.
45. Id. at 413.
[Vol. 11:213
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the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the States from
resorting to classification for the purposes of legislation .... But
the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.46
The Court considered the relationship between the classification
and the state's objective fair and substantial. In examining this
nexus, however, Justice Pitney concluded that the law was arbi-
trary and therefore unconstitutional. 7 The opinion intimated
that the Court would examine carefully both the means and
ends.48
Rather than developing along the lines suggested in F.S.
Royster, the rational basis analysis evolved into a very lenient
standard of review. In McGowan v. Maryland,49 a case that ad-
dressed whether certain statutory classifications within Mary-
land's Sunday Closing Law constituted an abridgement of the
equal protection clause, the Court observed:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.60
The rational basis test creates a presumption that the legis-
lature had a nondiscriminatory reason for enacting the law.51
Consequently, the party asserting the unconstitutionality of leg-
islation bears the burden of proving that no rational basis ex-
isted for its enactment.
46. Id. at 415.
47. Id. at 417.
48. Id. at 415-16.
49. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
50. Id. at 425-26.
51. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ("state legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality"); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970) (a classification with a reasonable basis will not offend the Constitution despite
some resulting inequality).
1991]
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As early as 1880, the Supreme Court intimated that legisla-
tion having a racially discriminatory purpose or effect would be
subjected to a higher standard of review.2 However, this higher
standard was not fully articulated by the Court until 1944 in
Korematsu v. United States.5" Korematsu challenged the consti-
tutionality of the World War II Congressional Exclusion Order5 "
that excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry from West Coast
areas during certain hours. Justice Black, the author of the opin-
ion, set forth the notion that legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group were "immediately suspect." 5
He further observed that legislation involving a suspect classifi-
cation 56 would be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny."'
Strict scrutiny, unlike rational basis review, poses an almost
insurmountable barrier for the proponents of the legislation.
Under strict scrutiny the defendant bears the burden of proof.
He must first demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest
or objective. Then he must demonstrate that the suspect classifi-
cation at issue is necessary to accomplish a government objective
which cannot be effectively carried out in a less discriminatory
manner.
5 8
The strict scrutiny analysis is limited to equal protection
challenges involving a suspect classification" or a fundamental
52. See supra note 37.
53. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
54. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942).
55. Id. at 216.
56. The traditional criteria used to determine which groups fall into a suspect class
are immutable characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth, or a class sad-
dled with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or regulated to such a political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities tends to seriously curtail
the operation of protective political processes, statutes directed at particular religious,
national, or racial minorities are subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny).
57. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
58. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (school board policy of
laying off senior, non-minority teachers to retain junior minority teachers is not narrowly
tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny review); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (one year residency requirement for voting franchise held unconstitutional where
30 day requirement would suffice).
59. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (poor families are not a suspect class); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (childless, non-property owners are a sus-
[Vol. 11:213
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right or interest implicitly or explicitly protected by the Consti-
tution. 0 Thus, whether rational basis or strict scrutiny will be
used as a standard of review is first determined by asking
whether a suspect classification or fundamental right or interest
is involved.
The proliferation of equal protection cases challenging clas-
sifications involving welfare benefits,"1 poverty, 2 education,"
and sex '4 was responsible in part for a growing judicial dis-
enchantment with the two tier approach. As early as 1973, Jus-
tice Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,65 noted:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protec-
tion cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the
appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere ration-
ality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection
defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this
Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of stan-
dards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal
pect class); Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (United States citizens of Japanese descent are a
suspect class).
60. The Supreme Court has not clarified what makes a right fundamental, but it has
observed that the appropriate question is not whether the right is considered important.
To be fundamental, the right has to be implicitly or explicitly protected by the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (although education
plays a fundamental role in society, it is not a fundamental right granted to individuals
by the Constitution); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977) (women do not have a
constitutional right to receive Medicaid coverage for abortion).
61. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (Court invali-
dated some provisions of the Food Stamp Act); Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (financial aid
statute does not violate equal protection clause merely because its effect is to provide
fewer benefits to children born to large families).
62. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Court held that
conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a fee violates the equal protection
clause); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of counsel to an indigent held
to be invidious discrimination).
63. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (statute which
allows the use of race to define the governmental decision-making structure violates the
equal protection clause); San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (Court found it reasonable to use local
property taxation to advance goals of local education).
64. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under 18 violated equal protection
clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (preference for men over women in the ap-
pointment of administrators of estates is an arbitrary denial of equal protection).
65. 411 U.S. 1, 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Protection Clause." s
As Justice Marshall pointed out, the Court had already
abandoned the two tier approach in practice, applying instead a
spectrum of standards to analyze equal protection claims. He
suggested that the Court also discard its semantical adherence
to the two tier approach.67
Three years later in Craig v. Boren," a licensed vendor of
3.2% beer and Craig, a male between eighteen and twenty-one
years of age, challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age
of twenty-one and to females under the age of eighteen. They
claimed the statute constituted a gender based discrimination
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, observed that leg-
islation which distinguished between males and females was
"subject to scrutiny" under the equal protection clause. 9 He
further noted that to withstand constitutional challenge a classi-
fication based on gender must serve an important governmental
objective and be substantially related to the achievement of that
objective.7 0 This intermediate level of equal protection review is
commonly referred to as the substantial factor test.
A. Equal Protection, African-Americans and Education
During the period between 1945 and 1972 the African-
American question again took on constitutional significance. The
Supreme Court, mindful of the not so distant past, first re-
sponded to the demand for social and constitutional equality by
removing barriers to equality of education.7 '
66. Id. at 98-99.
67. Id. at 99.
68. Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
69. Id. at 197.
70. Id.
71. In a series of cases prior to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
Supreme Court upheld the right of African-Americans to equal education opportunities.
See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Court held that the
fourteenth amendment precludes differences in educational treatment by the state based
upon race); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (a black student must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as a white student; held that a newly estab-
lished state law school for blacks was not substantially equal to white law school); Sipuel
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (Court held that a Negro
[Vol. 11:213
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Brown v. Board of Education"2 is beyond doubt the most
significant decision about African-Americans and their right to a
quality education. Brown addressed the issue of whether the seg-
regation of white and black children in the public schools of a
state, solely on the basis of race and pursuant to state law, de-
nied African-American children the equal protection of the
law. 3 Chief Justice Warren, noting the importance of a quality
education, stated:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.74
Brown is as important for what it did not do as it is for
what it did. Brown does not stand for the proposition that Afri-
can-American children are entitled to a quality education.
Rather, it merely provides that they are entitled to an opportu-
nity on terms equal to white children. How equal is equal, how-
ever, was not discussed. Another relevant point is that while the
facts presented in the case included a suspect classification,
state legislation and an equal protection challenge, the Court
failed to refer to the traditional strict scrutiny test.75
As it relates to educational opportunities for African-Ameri-
cans, the question of how equal is equal has never been ex-
pressly addressed by the United States Supreme Court. San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez7 does, how-
ever, shed some light on this question. The plaintiffs in this case
brought a class action on behalf of school children who were
members of poor families living in school districts having a low
property tax base." They claimed that the Texas system of
qualified to receive professional education offered by the state cannot be denied such
education because of color); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (hold-
ing that a state with an all-white state law school violated the equal protection clause
despite existence of out of state law school that admitted blacks).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 493.
75. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
76. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. Id. at 5.
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funding public education, based on local property taxation, fa-
vored the more affluent and violated the equal protection clause
because of substantial interdistrict disparities in per pupil ex-
penditures that resulted primarily from differences in the value
of assessable property among the districts. 8
The case compared the educational expenditures of two
school districts, Edgewood, where the plaintiffs lived, and Alamo
Heights. Edgewood is situated in the core city sector of San
Antonio in a residential neighborhood that had little commercial
or industrial property. The residents were predominantly of
Mexican-American descent. Approximately ninety percent of the
student population were Mexican-American while approximately
six percent were African-American. The average assessed prop-
erty value per pupil was $5,960 - the lowest in the metropoli-
tan area - and the median family income of $4,686 was also
the lowest. Approximately 22,000 students were enrolled in its
twenty-five elementary and secondary schools. The total per stu-
dent contribution for Edgewood was $356 per student in 1967-
1968.71
Alamo Heights was the most affluent school district in San
Antonio. It was situated in a residential community "quite un-
like the Edgewood District." 80 Its six schools housed approxi-
mately 5,000 students. The school's population was predomi-
nantly "anglo," having only eighteen percent Mexican-
Americans and less than one percent African-Americans. The as-
sessed property value per pupil exceeded $49,000 and the me-
dian family income was $8,001. The total per student contribu-
tion for Alamo Heights was $594 per pupil in 1967-1968.81
The district court, applying a strict scrutiny analysis, found
that the Texas scheme violated the equal protection clause.82
Justice Powell, however, reversed the lower court, observing that
although education is important, it is not among the rights af-
forded implicit or explicit protection under the Constitution. 3
He further noted that:
78. Id. at 19-20.
79. Id. at 11-12.
80. Id. at 12.
81. Id. at 12-13.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 35.
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The argument here is not that the children in districts having rel-
atively low assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality educa-
tion than that available to children in districts having more
assessable wealth.... [A] sufficient answer to appellee's argument
is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages."
While the majority expressly reaffirmed the position taken
in Brown,a5 San Antonio suggests that, with regard to education,
equality exists under the equal protection clause so long as there
is not an "absolute" deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
become educated. 86
Since Brown, the Court has repeatedly recognized the cru-
cial role that formal education plays in the life of every citizen.8 7
An individual's ability to achieve a decent job and income and
his ability to provide his children with these opportunities are
all determined, in part, by the quality of his education."a It is as
true today as it was prior to Brown that a person's birthplace,
his race, his cultural background and his parents' income are the
84. Id. at 23-24.
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It should be noted that the allegation in Brown was not that
African-American children were being denied educational opportunity, but that the qual-
ity of the opportunity they were receiving was inferior to that provided to white children.
Id. at 488.
86. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 20. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)
(holding that a school that fails to provide non-English speaking students with supple-
mental courses in the English language denies such students a "meaningful opportunity
to participate in the educational program . . ").
87. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 29-31.
88. Disagreement exists about the effect of education on disadvantaged groups. One
view is that schools have little effect independent of the child's background. Conse-
quently, at least in terms of academic achievement, this view holds that schools generally
fail to narrow the gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged students, and disadvan-
taged students are likely to leave school in a worse position, academically, relative to
their peers than when they entered.
Another view holds that there is a clear and independent relationship between what
schools do and the results they produce. This view is based on research which shows that
disadvantaged children generally attend schools that have inadequate , Jucational ser-
vices and facilities and less experienced staffs. C. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J.
MCPARTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFELD & R. YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNI-
TIES 288-89 (1988). For a summary of the Coleman Report see F. CORDASCO, M. HILLSON
& H. BULLOCK, THE SCHOOL IN THE SOCIAL ORDER: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO EDU-
CATIONAL UNDERSTANDING "107-49 (1970).
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major determinants of the quality of his education. It is, there-
fore, not surprising to find that the educational process in this
country has been described by the Senate Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity as being unequal in three inter-
related ways:
First, children from minority and economically disadvantaged
families live their. lives isolated from the rest of society. The fact
is that education in this country is still - for the most
part - segregated by race, economic and social class. Second,
minority and disadvantaged children are often treated in unequal
ways by schools themselves. Third, the financial resources for
public elementary and secondary education are both raised and
distributed inequitably so that the quality of a child's education
is largely dependent upon the taxable wealth of each school dis-
trict and its citizens.8 9
The segregation, unequal practices and treatment to which
disadvantaged students are subjected and the inequality of edu-
cational resources often combine to produce an absolute depri-
vation of a meaningful opportunity to attain a quality educa-
tion. 0 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, even in light of these
congressional findings, 1 narrowly interprets equal educational
89. Toward Equal Educational Opportunity, The Report of the Senate Select
Comm. on Equal Educ. Opportunity, S. REP. No. 92-000, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12
(1972). The performance, aspirations and motivations of disadvantaged children are
often adversely affected by the attitudes and expectations of their teachers, who often
label them as inferior and destined to fail. The disadvantaged child is often tracked in a
class or other group of "slow learners" or "underachievers." These children, in effect are
subjected to a labeling process based on their background rather than their ability or
potential. This virtually assures school failure and a life of unequal opportunity after
school. Id. at 12. Poor children usually attend schools with poor educational services. Id.
90. The Senate Select Committee also noted:
We have found neither uniformity in the enforcement of our Nation's civil rights
laws as they affect education nor equality of educational opportunity in many of
our Nation's schools .... [Plublic education is failing millions of American chil-
dren who are from racial and language minority groups, or who are simply poor.
Id. at 2.
91. The Senate Select Committee defined the term "equal educational opportunity":
As we will use the term, equal educational opportunity refers both to the results of
education and the way those results are produced.
It is a fundamental goal of our democratic system that life's opportunities be
distributed on the basis of each individual's capacity and choice and that no indi-
vidual be denied the chance to succeed because of his membership in a racial,
religious, social, economic, or other group in society. The extent to which this goal
is met is the test of both equal opportunity in our society and equal educational
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/1
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opportunity.
This conclusion is demonstrated by the Regents of Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke" opinion. In this case the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis had developed
two admissions programs for the entering class of 100 students.
Under the regular admissions program, candidates with an un-
dergraduate grade point average under 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were
rejected. Thereafter, select applicants were given an interview,
following which they were rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each
member of the faculty committee. The rating was based on the
interviewer's summaries, overall grade point average, science
courses grade point average, medical college admissions test
(MCAT) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular ac-
tivities and other biographical data, all of which resulted in a
total bench score. The full admissions committee then made of-
fers of admission on the basis of its review of the applicant's file
and score.93
A separate committee, a majority of whom were members of
minority groups, operated the special admissions committee. 4
Special candidates, individuals who were economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged or members of a minority group,
did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point cutoff and were not
ranked against candidates in the regular admissions process.
Special candidates were otherwise rated in the same manner as
employed in the regular program.95 Generally, sixteen of the 100
seats were filled through the special program. No white appli-
cant had ever been admitted through the special program.96
In 1973 and 1974, Bakke, a white male, applied to Davis.
Although he had a score of 468 out of 500 in 1973, he was re-
opportunity. Thus, in terms of the outcomes of formal schooling, equal educa-
tional opportunity is achieved when representative individuals with similar abili-
ties and making similar choices within each group in society have the same chance
to participate and succeed in life's activities.
But equal educational opportunity must also be defined in terms of the ab-
sence of inequality in the process of schooling and its components.
Id. at 3.
92. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
93. Id. at 273-74.
94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. at 275.
96. Id. at 276.
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jected because no applicants with scores less than 470 were be-
ing accepted through the regular program and because his appli-
cation was late.9 7 In 1974, Bakke scored 549 out of 600 but was
again rejected.98 In both years, special applicants with scores
lower than Bakke's were admitted. After his second rejection,
Bakke filed suit claiming that the special admissions program
operated to exclude him on the basis of race in violation of the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, a pro-
vision of the California Constitution and section VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."
The California Supreme Court, applying a strict scrutiny
analysis, found that the special admissions program violated the
equal protection clause; it also held that the University could
not take race into account in future admissions decisions. 100 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the equal protection
finding but reversed the holding that race could not be taken
into account during the admissions process. 10 1
Justice Powell, author of the opinion, noted that strict scru-
tiny was the proper standard because a suspect classification was
involved.10 2 In examining whether the classification was neces-
sary to the accomplishment of its purpose, Justice Powell noted
that:
The special admissions program purports to serve the purposes
of: (i) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored mi-
norities in medical schools and in the medical profession," (ii)
countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing
the number of physicians who will practice in communities cur-
rently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body.103
Justice Powell concluded that the University's objectives
were neither necessary nor compelling in light of the absence of
a judicial, legislative or administrative finding of some statutory
97. Id.
98. Id. at 277.
99. Id. at 279.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 319-20.
102. Id. at 305.
103. Id. at 305-06 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811)).
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or constitutional violation.""'
The Supreme Court's holding in Bakke raises three consti-
tutional issues. The first is whether racial classifications are in-
valid per se. The second is whether any classification based on
race can withstand strict scrutiny. The third is whether a lesser
standard of review may be applied in special circumstances, such
as those involving benign racial classifications.
The school desegregation cases demonstrate that racial clas-
sifications are not per se illegal.108 Thus, although the Supreme
Court in Korematsu v. United States'" noted that all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are suspect, this "is not to say that all such restrictions are un-
constitutional. 10 7 The classification must, however, be necessary
to promote a compelling government interest and be narrowly
tailored to that end.108
With regard to whether any classification based on race can
withstand strict scrutiny, Korematsu supports a positive re-
sponse.10 9 All that is necessary for benign racial classifications to
withstand equal protection challenges is that the Court construe
classifications which expand minority groups' access to opportu-
nities in education and employment as being necessary and com-
pelling. Such a suggestion is not unwarranted in light of congres-
sional findings that discrimination on the basis of race still
persists.1 0 The suggestion is further strengthened by the fact
that African-Americans were intended to be the primary benefi-
ciaries of the reconstruction amendments, including, of course,
104. Id. at 306-07.
105. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(schools whose students are all or virtually all of the same race require close scrutiny, but
their existence alone is not a sufficient indication of a segregated system); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (a freedom of choice plan in desegregating a
school system might be of use under appropriate circumstances; however, where there
are reasonable alternatives available which would provide for a speedier desegregation, a
freedom of choice plan is unacceptable).
106. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
107. Id. at 216 (the Court announced the strict scrutiny test but nevertheless upheld
the constitutionality of the Congressional Exclusion Order). See also supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
109. Id. See supra notes. 54-57 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 90.
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the equal protection clause.111
With regard to whether a lesser standard of review should
be applied to benign classifications, the Bakke opinion supports
a negative response.'12 The argument that a lesser standard of
review should be utilized in circumstances where a benign classi-
fication is employed is not, however, without judicial precedent.
For example, Brown v. Board of Education"s involved all the
prerequisites necessary for application of strict scrutiny, yet the
Court reached a correct decision without reference to any of the
equal protection standards. The various Bakke opinions seem-
ingly advocate a common concern for benign classifications.
114
Furthermore, judicial discontent with the traditional equal pro-
tection matrices suggests that they are in need of serious
reconsideration. 1
5
B. Equal Protection, African-Americans and Employment
In the present high technology era, employment opportuni-
ties are often influenced by one's education. It is not uncommon
to find job advertisements which require a college degree as a
minimum education level. The same societal discrimination
which exists in the educational process throughout this country
also exists in the work place. Consequently, much of the previ-
ous discussion is also relevant to the African-American experi-
ence in the work place. Much has been corrected by legislation
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.116 Much, how-
ever, remains to be done."
7
111. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
112. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-88 (1978).
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. The opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun suggests that
an intermediate level of review may be appropriate for benign classification. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 359. Justice Powell would apply strict scrutiny to benign classifications. Id. at
287-305. The opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that benefits should be provided on a color-blind ba-
sis. Id. at 408-21.
115. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
117. Title VII has been an effective tool in assisting African-Americans in gaining
access to lower level jobs in businesses, crafts and industries traditionally closed to them.
It has not, however, proven as useful to African-American executives. While the Supreme
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Title VII has been the major weapon used to attack and
remedy discrimination in the work place. The coverage of Title
VII, as amended,"1 8 extends as far as Congress' reach under its
authority to regulate commerce. 1"" Since the enactment of Title
VII, individuals have extensively relied on it to challenge alleg-
edly discriminatory employment practices. Under Title VII, a
claimant must meet certain procedural requirements to file
charges and must also have pursued appropriate state and fed-
eral administrative remedies before initiating a federal law-
suit.1 20 There is, however, no absolute right to a federal trial
under Title VII.' 2 ' Assuming that a plaintiff satisfies the proce-
dural requisites, there still remains the difficult task of proving
that specific employment practices have violated the statute.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an initial or prima
facie case of discrimination.12
The courts have developed two theories for assessing the
merits of employment discrimination cases. When a plaintiff as-
serts discriminatory treatment because of race, sex, national ori-
gin or religion, proof of the employer's discriminatory motive is
required.12 3 Where neutral policies with a "disparate impact" on
Court has not upheld a different standard for determining discrimination in upper level
employment as opposed to lower level employment, lower federal court decisions reflect
far greater leniency when confronted with cases alleging discrimination by executive or
professional employers than by lower level employers. See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ.,
502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974) (concerning advancement of medical school professors);
Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center, 558 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977) (court held
that black female county blood bank technician failed to prove prima facie case of racial
discrimination), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the early 19th Century the Supreme Court
has defined and redefined Congress' power to regulate commerce. Presently, the power to
regulate commerce is extremely broad, but it is not limitless.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
121. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). Courts have relied on
the doctrine of res judicata in holding that an individual cannot maintain a federal civil
rights action when the claim has been reviewed by the state judiciary. Id. at 476-78; see
also Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984) (the full faith and
credit clause precludes de novo consideration of Title VII cases where the decision or
question has been reached in state court).
122. A prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination, which if unexplained,
is "more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
123. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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African-Americans are challenged, no proof of discriminatory in-
tent is required.""
The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 1 2 5 ruled
that employment policies having a disparate impact on African-
Americans were unlawful unless the employer could show that
those policies were job-related and justified by "business neces-
sity.' 26 Under Griggs, an employer may not rely on proof that
the selection practices employed reflect a legitimate business
purpose and are consistent with general practices within the in-
dustry.127 The business necessity doctrine requires the employer
to demonstrate "that the practice [is] necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business." 128 Even if the employer sat-
isfies the burden of demonstrating a compelling business neces-
sity for the discriminatory practice, the plaintiff may still prevail
by showing that the employer's legitimate interest could be
served by less discriminatory means. 129
A second approach used in Title VII litigation is a claim of
"disparate treatment."8 0 This approach differs substantially
from disparate impact cases. In order to establish a prima facie
case in connection with hiring under this approach, the plaintiff
must first demonstrate that he is a member of a group protected
under Title VII.' " The plaintiff must then show that he applied
124. A "disparate impact" case is one in which the plaintiff alleges that a facially
neutral test or employment criterion which disproportionately disqualifies a protected
class from employment, promotion or other opportunity is not job-related. See id. at 432
(Congress was concerned not just with the motivation of employment practices but with
the consequences).
125. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
126. Id. at 431.
127. Id. at 429-33.
128. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (company seniority
system that restricted African-Americans to the lowest paying departments without pos-
sibility of transfers, held to be unlawful employment practice), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
129. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (height and weight require-
ments have an essential relationship to efficient job performance of a correctional
counselor).
130. See, e.g., Jones v. International Paper Co., 720 F.2d 496 (1983) ("disparate
treatment" occurs when an employer treats some people less favorably than others solely
because of their race); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)
("[employer] may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disrup-
tive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.").
131. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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for a job for which he was qualified and that he was rejected
despite such qualifications. 2 In addition, the plaintiff must
show that the position remained open after his rejection and
that the employer continued to seek applicants with the plain-
tiff's qualifications. 33
Once a prima facie case of disparate treatment is estab-
lished, the employer can rebut the inference of discrimination by
specifying a nondiscriminatory reason for the action.8" If the
employer is successful in rebutting the inference of discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff will then be given an opportunity to prove that
the asserted legitimate reason was a mere pretext for
discrimination. 8
In disparate treatment cases, the employer is not required
to accord preference to minorities or women among equally
qualified applicants. 3 6 The employer need only explain clearly
and specifically the nondiscriminatory reasons for the action.137
The plaintiff carries the burden of persuasion to prove inten-
tional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. "'
Under Title VII, courts have broad judicial latitude to for-
mulate relief for identified discrimination. Such relief has in-
cluded giving preference to members of minority groups as a
remedy for past discrimination, even where there was no finding
that the employer had acted with discriminatory intent.3 9
The Supreme Court has apparently divided race-conscious
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 804.
136. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (em-
ployer not required to show that male selected instead of female for a supervisory posi-
tion has superior qualifications); see also Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625
F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (after plaintiff demonstrates purposeful discrimination, em-
ployer has opportunity to show individual minority job applicants would not have been
hired absent the discrimination).
137. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
138. Burdine, 405 U.S. at 253.
139. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 332
(1977) (despite absence of specific evidence of discrimination or injury, the Court held
that those who were likely to have been harmed could be afforded recovery); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). (executive, judicial and congressional action
subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively establishes that Title VII does not
bar the remedial use of race).
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remedial plans into two classes. Where Congress has established
a race-conscious remedial program, there seems to be a pre-
sumption of validity, if the program is based on a congressional
finding of discrimination. For example, Fullilove v. Klutznick1 40
involved a Congressional enactment implementing a race-con-
scious set-aside program as part of the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977.' The Act contained the following require-
ment: "Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this [Act] ... unless the
applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at
least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be ex-
pended for minority business enterprises."14 2 Minority business
enterprises (MBEs) were defined as businesses effectively con-
trolled by "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Span-
ish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts. ' 143
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger did not em-
ploy strict scrutiny or any other traditional standard of equal
protection review. Rather, the opinion addressed the issues of
whether the objectives of the legislation were within the power
of Congress and, whether the limited use of racial and ethnic
criteria was a permissible means for Congress to carry out its
objective.14 4 The Court responded affirmatively to both ques-
tions. With regard to Congress' power, the Court noted that
"Congress not only may induce voluntary action to assure com-
pliance with existing federal statutory or constitutional antidis-
crimination provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to
declare certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and
induce state action to avoid such conduct."14 5 The opinion found
the limited use of race to be permissible because Congress had
substantial evidence that past discrimination had reduced mi-
nority participation in federal construction grants. " 6 The Court
also found the flexible nature of the ten percent set-aside to be
140. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
141. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1988)).
142. Id. at 117.
143. Id.
144. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
145. Id. at 483-84.
146. Id. at 477-78.
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persuasive.147
All other race-conscious remedial programs have been sub-
jected to the strict scrutiny test. The result of the application of
this rigorous standard is a foregone conclusion. In two recent de-
cisions, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education148 and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 49 the Court, applying a
strict scrutiny analysis, overturned affirmative action programs.
Croson is especially significant because the City of Rich-
mond relied on the federal legislation that withstood challenge
in Fullilove to develop its set-aside program.1 0 The Supreme
Court, however, was not convinced that state governmental bod-
ies have the same power as Congress to remedy discrimina-
tion.18' It also questioned the legitimacy of the city's finding of
past discrimination. 152 The Croson decision adds a new twist to
strict scrutiny as applied to race-conscious remedies. The re-
quirement of a specific finding, based on empirical evidence, of
discrimination on the part of the agency proposing the voluntary
program, in essence makes strict scrutiny "stricter scrutiny."
The Supreme Court has failed to realize that under the
equal protection clause, as under Title VII, discrimination can
be based on disparate treatment and disparate impact. Conse-
quently, race-conscious programs that purport to remove dispa-
rate racial impact need not be based on a finding of specific dis-
crimination. Rather, race-conscious relief can be sufficiently
supported by societal discrimination. For example, the serious
and persistent underrepresentation of minorities in various
fields of employment, as shown by statistics, demonstrates a
background of deliberate, purposeful discrimination against
minorities. 5 8
A strong argument for affirmative action was made over
thirteen years ago. It is worth noting that the statistics
presented at that time have not improved in the intervening
147. Id. at 487-88.
148. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
149. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
150. Id. at 480.
151. Id. at 490.
152. Id. at 499.
153. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES tables 628 and 645 (110th ed. 1990).
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years. That argument propounds:
The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but
inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Mea-
sured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful
equality remains a distant dream for the Negro.
A Negro child today has a life expectancy which is shorter by
more than five years than that of a white child. The Negro child's
mother is over three times more likely to die of complications in
childbirth, and the infant mortality rate for Negroes is nearly
twice that for whites. The median income of the Negro family is
only 60% that of the median of a white family, and the percent-
age of Negroes who live in families with incomes below the pov-
erty line is nearly four times greater than that of whites.
When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that
America offers him significantly less than it offers his white coun-
terpart. For Negro adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of
whites, and the unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is nearly
three times that of white teenagers. A Negro male who completes
four years of college can expect a median annual income of
merely $110 more than a white male who has only a high school
diploma. Although Negroes represent 11.5% of the population,
they are only 1.2% of the lawyers, and judges, 2% of the physi-
cians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and 2.6% of the
college and university professors.
The relationship between those figures and the history of un-
equal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be denied. At every
point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected in the
still disfavored position of the Negro.
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devas-
tating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the
mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the
highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will for-
ever remain a divided society.
I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us
to accept that fate. 154
154. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395-96 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court must reconsider traditional standards
of equal protection review for race-conscious relief in education
and employment. The different requirements for proving a stat-
utory or constitutional violation and specifically identified dis-
crimination severely undermine the notion of voluntary compli-
ance with the law.
Not that long ago, the doors of collective advancement were
simply closed to African-Americans. The removal of legal imped-
iments to equality has not enabled African-Americans to achieve
the social status, and the economic or political power necessary
to gain parity in society. Race discrimination in education and
employment is still the reality. Consequently, judicial assistance
is still needed. In the words of Justice Blackmun:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirma-
tive-action program in a racially neutral way and have it success-
ful.... In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare
not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial
supremacy.155
Advocates of equality of opportunity in education and em-
ployment have not gone unheard. Congress has determined that
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court have drastically cut
back the scope and effectiveness of civil rights legislation; conse-
quently, existing protection and remedies under federal law are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination. e15 This finding
served as the catalyst for the Civil Rights Bill of 1990157 which,
had it been enacted,155 would have effectively overturned numer-
ous civil rights opinions rendered by the Supreme Court during
the decade of the 1980s.159
155. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
156. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
157. Id.
158. On October 22, 1990, President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Bill of 1990, thus
becoming the third President to veto a civil rights bill and the first to have such a veto
sustained. Proponents of the bill have said that reintroducing the bill early in the 102nd
Congress will be their number one priority. Civil Rights Monitor, 5 LEADERSHIP CONFER-
ENCE EDUc. FuND 2 (1990).
159. Supreme Court decisions which would have been affected by passage of the
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More legislation will not resolve the African-American ques-
tion. Federal legislation, if enacted, will most likely be subjected
to constitutional challenges; thus, the likelihood exists that such
legislation will be analyzed in accordance with already estab-
lished legal standards. In essence, the Supreme Court will ulti-
mately define the parameters of the legislation applying estab-
lished standards.
Unfortunately, recent decisions rendered by the Court are
too reminiscent of the laissez faire attitude which existed within
the federal judiciary during the period following reconstruc-
tion.160 These similarities in conduct are too great to be
disregarded.
1990 Civil Rights Bill include: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1989);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
160. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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